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Some researchers have documented that the path of 
development is remarkably related to the pattern of 
sectoral diversification. Others have highlighted the 
relation between productive specialization and economic 
progress. This paper explores the role of product market 
competition and intellectual property rights protection in 
the pattern of sectoral diversification. The paper confirms 
the insight of the innovation literature, that competition 
induces firms to specialize and upgrade the quality of 
existing goods. However, it reveals a new force, called 
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the imitation effect, through which competition biases 
technical change toward product diversification. The 
paper shows that if knowledge spillovers increase with 
imitation, or the degree of product substitution is high, 
weak protection of property rights encourages firms to 
create low-quality goods, thereby directing technical 
change toward diversification. The predictions are tested 
with data on Italian firms' innovation activity. They are 
found to be consistent with observed behavior.Competition, Imitation, and Technical




In a recent paper, Imbs and Wacziarg[32] ﬁnd that the path of development
is remarkably related to the pattern of sectoral diversiﬁcation. Furthermore,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti[2] provide a theory that links sectoral diversiﬁca-
tion and market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. Other
contributions in this literature, including Gurley and Shaw[26] and Saint-
Paul[44], highlight the relation between productive specialization and eco-
nomic progress. This paper explores the role of product market competition
and intellectual property rights protection on the pattern of sectoral special-
ization.
In doing so, the paper develops an endogenous growth model in which
high-productive ﬁrms innovate and low-productive companies imitate. In-
novating ﬁrms can perform two diﬀerent types of innovations. They can
improve the quality of existing products, or they can create new but on av-
erage low-quality goods. Imitating ﬁrms decide what kind of good to copy.
The framework includes knowledge spillovers from the R&D activity, and a
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1negative externality from past innovations, which makes the invention of new
and better products progressively more diﬃcult.
The model delivers four predictions. First, it conﬁrms the insight of the
innovation literature that competition induces ﬁrms to introduce vertically
superior goods. However, it reveals a new force, through which competition
biases technical change toward product diversiﬁcation. We refer to this force
as the imitation eﬀect, and it appears as a result of the following process. On
one hand, competition encourages ﬁrms to upgrade the quality of existing
products because the marginal beneﬁt of adding one extra unit of quality
to an existing variety increases with the degree of product substitution. On
the other hand, competition makes the leading-edge quality grow at a faster
pace, which reduces the likelihood for high-quality products to be replaced
by new goods. This eﬀect increases the return from imitating leading va-
rieties, and thereby shifts innovators’ incentives from specialization toward
diversiﬁcation.
Second, the model supports the standard result that weak protection
for intellectual property rights reduces R&D incentives. However, it shows
that if knowledge spillovers increase with imitation, or the degree of product
substitution is high, imitation has a larger negative impact on product spe-
cialization than on product diversiﬁcation. In other words, imitation biases
technological change toward the creation of low-quality goods. This result is
novel, and highlights a relevant issue related to the role governments might
play in fostering economic progress through strengthening intellectual prop-
erty rights.
Third, the model shows that the increasing complexity to innovate in both
dimensions introduces a complementarity between both types of innovations,
which makes the simultaneous creation of new and better products more
proﬁtable than the development of each activity in isolation. As a result,
quality and variety grow together. Finally, combining the ﬁrst and the third
predictions, the paper rationalizes why quality up-grading is an inverted
U-shaped function of the degree of product market competition. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that provides microeconomic foundations
to such relationship within a framework that allows ﬁrms to innovate in more
than one dimension.
2To assess empirically the predictions of the model and the mechanisms it
proposes, the paper employs data on Italian ﬁrms’ innovation activity during
the periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. The data oﬀer a particularly good
ground to test the theory, as they provide detailed information about the
types of innovations that ﬁrms decide to carry out. The theoretical ﬁndings
are found to be robustly consistent with observed behavior.
Literature review
This paper relates to the literature on competition, imitation, and innovation.
Standard theories such as the one provided by Schumpeter[45], Dasgupta and
Stiglitz[19], Spence[49], Romer[43], Aghion and Howitt[5], Grossman and
Helpman[25], and Vives[53] highlight a negative relationship between inno-
vation and competition. Others such as Sutton[51], Shaked and Sutton[47],
and Motta[39] suggest instead a positive association; while another group
of papers, including Aghion, Harris, and Vickers[3], Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers[4], Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt[6], claim a
non-monotonic relationship.
The empirical evidence continues to be mixed. Some empirical works by
Porter[41], Geroski[23], Baily and Gersbach[8], Nickell[40], Blundell, Griﬃth
and Van Reenen[12], and Symeonidis[52] support the view that competitive
pressures encourage innovation. Others such as Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Griﬃth, and Howitt[6] show that the relation is inverted U-shaped.
Regarding the impact of imitation on innovation, the results are also quite
diverse. Some contributions, including Helpman[28], Glass and Saggi[26],
and Dinopoulos and Sergerstrom[19], remark the potential disadvantages of
strong IPRs on innovation. Others, such as Lai[35] and Yang and Maskus[54],
highlight, by contrast, that intellectual property rights protection (IPRs)
foster innovation and technology diﬀusion. Interestingly, all the papers rely
on the same assumption, that ﬁrms innovate exclusively in one dimension
i.e., process-innovation, product-innovation, or quality-innovation. However,
the literature has been silent about the role competition and imitation play
to bias technical change. This paper comes to ﬁll this gap.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 solves the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
3The last section concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents a model built on a combination of the love for variety
approach of Spence[50] and Dixit and Stiglitz[20], and the Howitt[29] model
of endogenous growth with vertical and horizontal innovations.1 In this set
up, the economy consists of two sectors, one in which ﬁrms produce a ﬁnal
good, and another sector in which ﬁrms create new and improved versions of
the existing intermediate products.
2.1 Final Good Sector
Firms in this sector generate consumption goods and R&D services, under
perfect competition using the same technology. The economy output is pro-
duced with a constant returns to scale production function. The inputs in
the production process are labor and a continuum of intermediate products.
Total output of the economy at time t is as follows:













Ct is consumption; Ht are horizontal R&D expenditures; Vt are vertical
R&D expenditures; Nt is the number of intermediate products available in
the economy; qit is the quality of variety i; xit is the quantity of variety
i; σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the
intermediate good; and Lyt is labor.
A typical ﬁrm j that produces the ﬁnal good maximizes its proﬁts πjt
choosing Lyjt and xijt, where πjt is given by the following expression:
1Vertical innovations are related to the improvement of existing products while hori-















pit stands for the price of intermediate input i, and wt is the wage bill per
worker. The solution to the proﬁt maximization problem delivers the follow-


































2.2 Intermediate Good Sector
This sector is composed by two sets of ﬁrms, innovators and imitators, dis-
tinguished by an exogenous pattern of productivity to innovate. High pro-
ductive ﬁrms are innovators while low productive companies are imitators.
In the steady-state, the proportion of imitators relative to innovators is equal
to m.2
2.2.1 Innovators
Innovators can engage into two diﬀerent types of R&D activities, vertical
and horizontal. When ﬁrms involve in the vertical activity, they do so
with the goal of increasing the quality of an existing intermediate prod-
uct. The new good embodies the highest quality of the market, Qt i.e.
2We make this assumption because we are not interested in explaining the decisions to
enter in the innovation or imitation activities. However, we are concerned with rational-
izing the type of products that innovators and imitators decide to produce.
5Qt ≡ max{qit : i ∈ [0,Nt]}.3 And the innovator enters in Bertrand com-
petition with the previous supplier of the product.
Each ﬁrm j that intends to innovate vertically in variety i faces a poisson
probability equal to φv
ijt =
vijt
Qt of being successful, where vijt are the R&D
expenditures that the ﬁrm devotes to the research activity. Division by Qt
captures the idea that as time goes by and better products are introduced,
researchers’ productivity falls because the innovation processes becomes more
complex.4
As in Caballero and Jaﬀe[15], and Howitt[29], the leading-edge quality
grows over time as a result of knowledge spillovers produced in the vertical
R&D activity. The size of the spillovers is proportional to the aggregate ﬂow
of vertical innovations, φv
tNt, and the factor of proportionality is given by
γ
Nt. Parameter γ captures the intensity of the imitation activity. Division
by Nt reﬂects the idea that as a sector develops an increasing number of
intermediate products, each vertical innovation has a smaller impact on the
stock of public knowledge used by researchers. As a result, the leading-edge










Firms also engage in the horizontal R&D activity with the purpose of
expanding the set of intermediate products. The quality of the new good
is random and picked from the existing distribution of quality. Each ﬁrm




Nt of being successful, where hjt are the R&D expenditures the ﬁrm
devotes to the horizontal activity. Division by Nt captures the idea that as
a sector develops an increasing number of intermediate goods the invention
of new products becomes more diﬃcult.
2.2.2 Imitators
Imitating ﬁrms decide what kind of good to copy. In doing so, they compare
the reward of imitating a high-quality product versus that of copying a non-
3As in Grossman and Helpman[25], Aghion and Howitt[5], we assume that since the
current leaders have less to gain from vertically innovating than other ﬁrms, they do not
participate in vertical R&D races.
4This assumption guarantee a balanced growth path equilibrium. Furthermore, Jaﬀe
and Hall[33] have provided some evidence of increasing innovation complexity.
6leading good. This product is chosen randomly from the existing distribution










zv and zh are realizations of random variables associated with the likelihood
of being successful in the imitation process. As copying a high-quality prod-
uct is a more complex process than imitating a low-quality good, we assume
variable Z ≡ zv
zh is distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 1]. Rv
it is the
reward of up-grading the quality of an existing product, and Rh
jt is that of
creating a new good. If an innovator is imitated, he retains a proportion λ
of the beneﬁts of his invention, while the rest, 1 − λ, is appropriated by the
fraudulent ﬁrm.
3 Equilibrium
This section solves the equilibrium of the model. For such purpose, we ﬁrst
characterize the distribution of quality in the steady-state. Second, we deter-
mine the equilibrium behavior of imitators. Finally, we ﬁnd the equilibrium
decisions of innovators.
3.1 Distribution of Quality in the Steady-State
When imitators and innovators decide what kind of product to produce, they
compare the expected rewards of manufacturing a low-quality product versus
that of producing a high-quality good. The relevant variable in such decisions
is the ratio of sales in each scenario. Using equation (4), this ratio can be
written as follows:6
5Notice that there will be no two imitating ﬁrms targeting the same variety. As
Bertrand competition will leave them with negative proﬁts.
6For the moment, assume that the price of each type of product is the same. This will









Expression (8) can be interpreted as the comparative disadvantage of the av-
erage ﬁrm relative to the leading company, adjusted by the degree of product
market competition. To write expression (8) as a function of the parame-
ters of the model; we need to characterize the distribution of quality in the
steady-state. For such purpose, we employ two diﬀerential equations:









Φt ≡ P(qit < Q0) and Q0 is the leading quality of period t0. Equation (9)
says that after time t0, the rate at which vertical innovations cause the mass
of products behind Q0 to fall is, in the steady-state, equal to the overall
ﬂow of vertical innovations occurring in varieties currently behind Q0. There
are Φt of such goods, and the Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations in
each of these products is equal to φv
t. Equation (10) shows that the leading
quality grows over time as a result of knowledge spillovers in the vertical
activity. The following proposition characterizes the distribution of quality
in the steady-state.
Proposition 1 The distribution of ait ≡
qit
Qt converges monotonically to the
invariant distribution Pr = (ait ≤ a) = F(a) = a
1










it F 0(a)da = 1
[γσ+(γ−1)].
The methodology employed to proof proposition 1 borrows from
Sergerstrom[46], and it is presented in the Appendix. Corollary 1 shows
8that imitation makes the knowledge spillovers to ﬂow at a larger pace. As
a result, the sale-gap between the average ﬁrm and the leading ﬁrm is an
increasing function of imitation. This gap also depends positively on the
degree of product market competition.
3.2 Imitators
Given equation (6) and (7), the probability of imitating a vertical innovator













Inserting the result of Corollary 1 into equation (11) we obtain the following
solution:
P = 1 −
1
[γσ + (γ − 1)]
. (12)
Equation (12) shows that imitation and competition increase the probability
that imitators copy a high-quality product. Indeed, if γ > 1.5 or σ > 2,
quality innovators are more exposed to imitation than variety inventors as
P > 0.5.
3.3 Innovators
Entry in the innovation activity occurs until the marginal ﬁrm just breaks
even. The free entry condition for quality-innovations is as follows:





it = vijt. (13)
The free entry condition for variety-innovations is:





it] = hjt. (14)
9Since arbitrage can not occur in equilibrium, both R&D activities must yield
identical rewards. Therefore, combining equations (13) and (14); we obtain




[1 − P(σ,γ)m(1 − λ)]
[1 − (1 − P(σ,γ)(1 − λ)m)]
[γσ + (γ − 1)]. (15)
Four implications can be obtained from equation (15).
Implication 1: Let γ > 1.5 or σ > 2. The larger the proportion of ﬁrms
that receive a negative impact from imitation, m, the lower the quality-bias






(1 − λ)(2P(σ,γ) − 1)[γσ + (γ − 1)]
[1 − (1 − P(σ,γ)(1 − λ)m)]2 < 0 (16)
Implication 2: Competition aﬀects the quality- bias of technical change
through two diﬀerent channels. A positive business-stealing eﬀect, and a






−(1 − λ)[2mP(σ,γ) − 1][γσ + γ − 1]




[1 − P(σ,γ)m(1 − λ)]γ





The ﬁrst eﬀect is related to the shift of incentives that competition gener-
ates toward specialization. When competition is high, the entrance of new
products in the market reduces incumbents’ output by much more than in
the case where goods are imperfect substitutes. As a result, innovators es-
cape from competition by upgrading the quality of the existing intermediate
products.
The second eﬀect directs technological change in the opposite direction.
And it is a result from the fact that, through the business-stealing eﬀect,
10competition increases knowledge spillovers and makes the leading-edge qual-
ity grow at a faster pace. Thereby encouraging imitators to copy high-quality
goods.
Implication 3: The complexity to innovate in both dimensions introduces a
complementarity between quality and variety. As a result, they grow together
i.e.,
gQt = gNt. (18)
To understand how the complementarity between quality and variety emerges
in our model, suppose that the economy is out of the equilibrium situation,
and that the non-arbitrage condition is not satisﬁed, with the reward to hor-
izontal investments exceeding that of vertical research. Under this scenario,
R&D ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to innovate only in the horizontal dimension.
However, as time goes by, and new products are introduced, researchers’
productivity falls because innovation becomes more complex. The proba-
bility of being successful in this process diminishes, and thereby horizon-
tal innovations start to become less attractive. Firms continue investing in
the horizontal direction until a point in time at which quality up-grading
is equally rewardable. Since in equilibrium both types of innovations must
deliver the same proﬁts, quality and variety must grow together.
Related evidence of this result at the country-level has been documented
by Broda and Weinstein[13]. The authors report that in 1988, the average
number of varieties exported by a country to the U.S was 12,822. This
number increases to 14,572 in 1990, and continues growing up to a value of
16,390 in 2001. At the same time, the average value of a variety exported
to the U.S was 2.67 dollars in 1988, 2.72 dollars in 1990, and 4.30 dollars in
2001.
Implication 4: Let Ω ≡
[1−P(σ,γ)m(1−λ)]
[1−(1−P(σ,γ)(1−λ)m)][γσ + (γ − 1)], Ω0 ≡ ∂Ω
∂σ and
Ω00 ≡ ∂2Ω
∂2σ. If Ω0N + Ω∂N
∂σ > 0 when σ −→ 1, Ω0N + Ω∂N
∂σ < 0 for some
σ > 1, and Ω00N +2Ω0 ∂N
∂σ +Ω∂2N
∂2σ < 0, then quality up-grading is an inverted
U-shaped function of σ.
11This implication shows that we can decompose the eﬀect of product mar-
ket competition, σ, on quality up-grading, Qt, into two diﬀerent eﬀects: a
substitution eﬀect, Ω0N, and a complementary eﬀect, Ω∂N
∂σ . The ﬁrst eﬀect
is related to the shift of incentives that changes in σ generate towards the
introduction of vertically superior products. This eﬀect is positive as long
as the marginal gain from adding one extra unit of quality to an existing
variety exceeds the expected marginal loss from imitation. The second eﬀect
emerges as a result of the complementarity between quality- and variety-
innovations. And it aﬀects quality up-grading in a contrary direction to that
of the substitution eﬀect.
Under the conditions described by implication 4, the model provides new
theoretical foundations for the inverted U-shape relationship between vertical
innovations and the degree of product market competition. It is interesting,
that since 1970 until recently, there has been a lot of theoretical and em-
pirical eﬀort to try to ﬁgure out the shape of that relationship. However, it
was not until 2004, when Aghion et al.[5] present their work, that the liter-
ature reaches a consensus. The authors rationalizes the inverted U-function
with a step-by-step approach to technological progress, according to which
incumbent innovators are not automatically leap-frogged by their rivals. In
their model, competition may increase the incremental proﬁt from innovat-
ing. However, it may also reduce innovation incentives for laggard ﬁrms. Our
paper provides another explanation to such relationship based on the substi-
tution and complementarity between diﬀerent dimensions of the innovation
process. We devote the following section to explore empirically the results.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section is organized as follows. First, we describe the data we employ
to test the implications of the model. This involves the description of the
proxies we construct, and a preliminary analysis of the data. Second, we
present the empirical results together with some robustness checks.
124.1 Data
To test the model, we employ a survey conducted by the Central Bank of
Italy, which gathers information about the innovative activity of Italian man-
ufacturing ﬁrms during the periods 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. The data-set
collects information for up to 4,660 and 3,452 ﬁrms during each period, re-
spectively. A sub-sample of 1,634 companies has been followed since 1998
until 2003. The survey oﬀers a particular good ground to test the theoretical
ﬁndings, as it provides information on the types of innovations that ﬁrms
decide to carry out. It also records business perceptions on the impact of
imitation on enterprise performance.
4.1.1 Proxies
To test the model, we need to construct a proxy for the quality-bias of tech-
nical change. We also need a measure of the (quasi) elasticity of substitution
between products, σ, and a proxy for the intensity of the imitation activ-
ity, m. The following paragraphs describe the proxies we construct for such
purpose.
Quality-bias of technical change
To build a proxy for
Qt
Nt, we employ the theoretical assumption according
to which the leading-edge quality grows over time as a result of knowledge
spillovers in the vertical activity, which are a function of the number of ﬁrms
that up-grade the quality of the existing products. Thus, our proxy is deﬁned
as the ratio between the number of ﬁrms that in a sector innovate to improve
a good, relative to those that innovate to create new varieties. The survey
gathers information about the size of each innovation: low, medium, and
high. However, we restrict our analysis to high inventions, because they are
the most correlated to R&D expenditures. We calculate our measure of the
quality bias of technology for each 3-digit ATECO-91 sectors, and we focus
on sectors that have more than 5 ﬁrms. We do so, to avoid having to employ
the Cox transformation for sectors with no innovation, which is problematic
as it delivers outlier values.
(Quasi) Elasticity of Substitution
13To measure σ we employ the estimations and the sectoral classiﬁcation pro-
posed by Broda and Weinstein[13]. The authors extend the seminal work by
Feenstra[21], and use data on U.S imports during the period 1990-2001 to
estimate the elasticity of substitution between two products under a monop-
olistic competitive framework. They obtain estimations of such parameter
for each 3-digit SITC (Rev.3) sectors, and they classify sectors in three cat-
egories: low-σ, medium-σ, and high-σ. Low-σ sectors are below the 33rd
percentile in the distribution of the estimated σ. Medium-σ sectors are be-
tween the 33rd percentile and the 66th percentile. High-σ sectors are above
the 66th percentile.
Imitation
To measure m we employ information about the impact of imitation on
innovators’ performance. The survey allows ﬁrms to classify such impact
as follows: strongly signiﬁcant, signiﬁcant, or irrelevant. We deﬁne m as the
proportion of ﬁrms that in a particular sector receive a strongly signiﬁcant
negative impact on sales due to imitation.
4.1.2 Data analysis
Before turning to the estimations, we look to the data and we analyze if there
is preliminary evidence in support of our model. Because Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 are crucial to derive our results, we start the analysis explor-

















[γσ + (γ − 1)]
. (19)
Figure 1 shows the relationship the data describe. In the y-axis we measure a
proxy for the left hand side of equation (19), which is deﬁned as the average
of the ratio of the sales of any ﬁrm to that of the leading supplier, adjusted by
the power of σ−1. In the x-axis we measure the right hand side, assuming γ =
1. The line represents the pattern we should observe according to the theory.
The scatter plot shows the relationship the data describe. Interestingly, both
graphs display similar patterns.
14[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In addition, we examine if there is evidence supporting other results. Table
1 presents summary statistics of the main variables, and Table 2 shows their
averages across sectoral categories with low-σ, medium-σ, and high-σ.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Table 2 shows that the mean of the quality-bias of technical change increases
with the degree of product market competition. This measure is equal to
2.439, 3.755, and 3.961, for low-σ, medium-σ, and high-σ sectors, respec-
tively. The table also reports that the proportion of ﬁrms that receive a
negative impact from imitation is larger in high-σ sectors than in medium-σ
ones. Finally, we look to the growth rates of quality and variety innovations
at sectoral level and we ﬁnd that their correlation is positive, equal to 0.343,
and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. This is consistent with our ﬁnding
of complementarities. Overall, the evidence points to support the theoretical
ﬁndings. However, we should explore these issues more formally. We devote
the following section to this purpose.
4.2 Empirical Results
This section presents a set of diﬀerent tests we perform to assess the empirical
validity of our theory. First, we analyze whether competition and imitation
bias technical change towards quality or variety. Second, we provide evidence
of the channel through which imitation encourages ﬁrms to create new but on
average low quality goods. Third, we test the existence of complementarities
between quality- and variety-innovations.
4.2.1 Competition, imitation and technical bias towards quality
To analyze how competition and imitation bias technical change towards
quality, we employ equation (15), and we assume γ01. This allow us to sep-
arate the business-stealing eﬀect from the competition eﬀect. The resulting




[[1 − m(1 − λ)]σ + 1]
[(σ − 1)m(1 − λ)]
σ. (20)
Then, we apply logarithm to both sides of equation (20) to disentangle one















= β0 + β1ln(1 + msσs) + β2lnσs + β3ln(1 + ms) + β4Zs + µs. (22)
Zs is a vector of control variables at sectoral level. It includes variables such
as the logarithm of workers, the logarithm of the volume of exports, capital
intensity of the sector, and skill intensity of the sector.8 We include these
variables to be sure that the coeﬃcients of interest are capturing the eﬀect
we want to measure and not the impact of one of these variables if they are
omitted from the model. In particular, capital and skill intensive sectors
may have an advantage in the production of high quality products. Sectors
with large volume of exports frequently supply better goods to appeal to
the standards of international markets, and large sectors innovate strongly
in both dimensions.
Since data on imitation are only available for the period 2001-2003, our
results correspond to that period. According to the theory, coeﬃcient β1 is
expected to be negative, and coeﬃcient β2 is expected to be positive. Table
3 presents the estimation results.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
7We add 1 to the logarithm of mσ to avoid missing observations for which m = 0.
8We employ the Bartlesman and Gray[9] data set to construct the capital and skill
intensity indices.
16Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) display the regression outcomes when the
dependent variable is as in equation (22). Columns (3), (5), (7), and (9)
show the estimation outputs when we redeﬁne it, by adding cost reducing
innovations to quality ones.9 In this case, the empirical evidence shows the
impact of competition and innovation on the vertical bias of technical change.
Columns (2)-(5) present the regression outputs for speciﬁcations without the
constant term. The other columns report the estimation results for speciﬁ-
cations with constant. Columns (2), (3), (6), and (7) display the estimation
outputs when we test the σ-competition eﬀect with the estimated σ from
Broda and Weinstein[13]. The other columns report the results for the cases
where we employ the Broda and Weinstein[13] sectoral classiﬁcation.
The results presented in column (2) provide evidence in support of the
theory. There is a positive σ-competition eﬀect and a negative σ-imitation
eﬀect. A 10% change in σ causes, through the ﬁrst eﬀect, a 11.77% change
in the quality-bias of technical change. The same variation generates on the
average sector, through the second eﬀect, a -9.93% change on the quality bias
of technical bias. Both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Imitation aﬀects the quality-variety ratio through two diﬀerent channels.
The ﬁrst one corresponds to the channel we describe in the theoretical model,
which impacts negatively on ﬁrms’ incentives to provide high-quality prod-
ucts. A 10% increment in the propensity to imitate delivers a -9.93% change
on the quality bias of the average sector. The second channel may be related
to the eﬀect of knowledge spillovers, γ, which encourage ﬁrms to up-grade
the quality of existing products. A 10% change in m causes, through this
way, a 34% increment on the quality-bias of technical change. However, this
eﬀect is not robust to other speciﬁcations.
According to column (2) capital intensive and large exporter sectors bias
the technical change towards quality innovations. A 10% change in the vol-
ume of exports generates a 0.8% change in the quality-bias of technical
change. The results displayed in column (3) quite resemble those of col-
umn (2), both in magnitude and statistical sense. Column (4) shows that
the sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of interest are the same as that
9It is straightforward to show that our model is isomorphic to both types of research
activities.
17in column (2). A change from the category of low-σ sectors to medium-σ
sectors increases discretely the innovation composition of quality relative to
variety in 1.849 points. Such increment is equal to 2.71 points if we compare
low-σ sectors with high-σ ones. These results are robust to redeﬁnitions of
the dependent variable, and all the empirical ﬁndings are consistent across
speciﬁcations.
4.2.2 Potential sources of empirical concern
Three potential sources of concern regarding the estimation of equation (22)
are the following: the existence of endogenous explanatory variables, the lack
of control for unobserved sectoral characteristics, and the reverse causality
problem. This section explains the problems these drawbacks can deliver and
the way we address them.
Endogenous regressors
It may be argued that the intensity of the imitation activity is an endogenous
variable, or that the volume of exports, or the size of a sector depend on
ﬁrms’ decisions. If these arguments are valid, the covariances between the
explanatory variables and the error term are diﬀerent from zero, and the
estimated coeﬃcients are inconsistent. The method of instrumental variables
(IV) provides a general solution to this problem. Employing the IV approach
requires to ﬁnd, for each endogenous regressor, an observable variable which
satisﬁes two conditions. The ﬁrst condition requires that the variable be
not correlated with the error term. The second requirement demands that
the coeﬃcient of the instrumental variable in the linear projection of the
endogenous variable onto all the exogenous regressors be statistically diﬀerent
from zero. This condition means that the instrument is correlated with the
endogenous variable once the other exogenous variables have been netted
out.
Finding an instrument for the intensity of the imitation activity at sec-
toral level is not a simple task as most of the measures of intellectual property
rights protection are only available at country level. To exploit these data,
we combine information on export destinations at ﬁrm-level with measures
of intellectual property rights protection from Ginarte and Park[24]. There
18are 8 broad destinations to which ﬁrms can export: EU (EUR) (countries
included before 2001); Russia and other European countries (ROE); Africa
(AFR); Middle East and Asia (excluding China)(MEA); China (CHI); U.S,
Canada and Mexico (UCM); Center and South America (CSA), and Aus-
tralia and Oceania (AUO). For each ﬁrm, we construct an index of patent
protection, which is deﬁned as a weighted average of its regional-trading
partners’ IPRs, where the weights are the shares of exports on total sales.
We then deﬁne the average of these index across ﬁrms as our instrumental
variable. We instrument exports and size with their lagged values.
Table 4 shows the t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the second con-
dition for an instrumental variable is not satisﬁed. The test is rejected for
the three variables. The last row reports the p-values of the exogeneity tests.
These tests are rejected for imitation and exports.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Given the existence of endogenous variables, we can not rely on the results
of Table 3 to assess empirically the validity of our theory. Thereby, to solve
this problem, we use the IV approach, and we re-estimate equation (22)
employing the instruments. Table 5 presents the estimation outputs. The
econometric speciﬁcation of each column corresponds to the same column in
Table 3.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Interestingly, all the results are in line with the theory. According to column
(2), a 10% change in σ generates, through the competition eﬀect, a 9.68%
change in the quality-bias of technical change. Such variation causes, through
the imitation eﬀect, a -2.55% reduction in the bias of technical change. This
eﬀect is also equivalent to an increment of 10% in the degree of imitation. The
fact that the new coeﬃcient for the instrumented IPRs-variable is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level highlights the importance of comple-
mentary IPRs-policies, among trading partners, to promote the creation of
high quality products. The most notorious diﬀerences between Tables 3 and
5 are related to the signiﬁcance of other variables such as capital intensity,
19size, and volume of exports. The positive impact of capital intensity is not
any more robust to modiﬁcations in the econometric speciﬁcation. The same
occurs with the volume of exports. In the new regressions, size appears to
have a signiﬁcant and negative impact on the bias of technology, while the
volume of exports becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
Unobserved sectoral characteristics
Having solved the endogeneity problem, we now move to analyze how the
lack of control for unobserved sectoral characteristics aﬀects our results. If
an omitted characteristic is correlated with a regressor, we have inconsis-
tency problems. If the unobserved feature is uncorrelated with any explana-
tory variable, but it aﬀects systematically the dependent one, we have bias
problems. One possibility to solve the inconsistency problem is to ﬁnd in-
struments for the regressors correlated with the unobservable features, and to
employ the instrumental variable approach. As we have done this before, we
discard inconsistency as a problem. A way to solve the bias problem consists
in controlling for observable characteristics correlated with the unobservable
ones. Typical controls at sectoral level include: capital intensity, skill inten-
sity, size, and exports. As we have done this before, we rule out bias in the
estimated coeﬃcients as a problem.
Reverse causality
The last source of concern regarding the estimation of equation (22) is the
reverse causality problem. It may be argued that rather than estimating the
eﬀect of imitation on the relative supply of high and low quality products,
we may be estimating the reverse eﬀect. There are two reasons to invalidate
this argument. First, assume the statement is true. If quality up-grading en-
hances imitation, then we would expect coeﬃcients β1 and β3 to be positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. However, this is not the case. Second, instru-
menting ms with policy variables rules out the reverse causality possibility,
as these they are exogenous regressors.
4.2.3 Robustness checks
Having discussed about some sources of empirical concern, we now move
to conduct two robustness checks. The ﬁrst one consists in testing the
20σ-competition eﬀect using the Rauch[42] classiﬁcation. This classiﬁcation
groups sectors in three categories: goods traded in organized exchange,
reference-priced products, and diﬀerentiated goods.10 The second robust-
ness check consists in employing the ratio of R&D expenditures in quality-
innovations to that in variety-innovations as the dependent variable. Because
the survey does not provide information about the way ﬁrms splits total R&D
expenditures across the two dimensions of the innovation process, with the
exception of cases where ﬁrms innovate in one dimension, we assume that if a
ﬁrm conducts quality- and variety-innovations, it spends the same amount of
money in each activity. Table 6 presents the estimation results corresponding
to these robustness exercises.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Column (2) shows estimation outputs from the ﬁrst robustness check. Col-
umn (3) presents the results from the second one. The ﬁrst column shows
evidence of a positive σ-competition eﬀect. A change from the diﬀerentiated
to the reference-priced category increases discretely the quality bias of tech-
nology in e0.365 points. The coeﬃcient of the σ-imitation eﬀect is negative
but insigniﬁcant, while that of imitation is negative but signiﬁcant at 1%
level. Finally, column (3) shows that the results are robust to the use of
other dependent variables. All the estimated coeﬃcients have signs in line
with the theory, and they are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Now, we move to test the channel through which imitation biases the tech-
nical change. This is presented in the following section.
4.2.4 Do imitators copy quality- or variety-innovations?
We have shown in previous sections, that imitation reduces ﬁrms’ incentives
to innovate in both dimensions, but if 1.5 < γ and/or 2 < σ, it has a
larger impact on quality up-grading. To test this prediction, we estimate the
following probit model:




jir = γ0 + γ1IQj + γ2IVj + γ3IXj + γ4Prodj + γ5LnSizej+ (23)
γi + γr + µjir
IMITjir = 1[IMIT
∗
jir > 0], (24)
where the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, which takes value 1 if ﬁrm
j from industry i and region r has received a signiﬁcant negative impact from
imitation and 0otherwise. Variables IQj, IVj, IXj are dummy variables that
take value 1 if ﬁrm j is a quality innovator, a variety innovator or an exporter,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Variable Prodj stands for ﬁrm j’s productivity
and LnSizej stands for the logarithm of workers. Parameters γi and γr
capture industry and regional eﬀects, and µjir stands for the error term,
which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance
equal to 1. Table 7 presents the estimation outputs.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Column (1) reports the marginal eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the de-
pendent one.11 The results provide evidence in line with the theory. A switch
from the category of no innovator to the category of quality-inventor increases
discretely the probability of imitation by 5.8% points, while a change from
the category of no inventor to that of variety-innovator raises the imitation
probability by 2.8% points. The ﬁrst eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 1% level, while
the second one is signiﬁcant only at 10% percent. Finally, productive ﬁrms
are also more likely to receive a negative impact from imitation. A 10%
increment in the productivity of the average ﬁrm increases the probability
that its product be copied by 2.44e−9 points. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 10%
level. Small ﬁrms have also a larger probability of being imitated than big
ones.
11The eﬀects are estimated for the average ﬁrm.
22A potential source of concern regarding the estimation results of col-
umn (1) relies on the endogeneity of some explanatory variables such as the
quality-, variety-innovator, and exporter conditions. As we explain before,
this problem can deliver inconsistent coeﬃcients. To address this drawback,
we instrument the endogenous regressors with their lagged values. Table 8
displays the instrumental variable tests. Row (2) shows the t-statistics of the
null hypothesis that each instrument is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
in the linear regression of the endogenous variable onto all the explanatory
ones.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The test is rejected for the three variables. The row at the bottom of the
table reports the p-value corresponding to the Wald test of joint exogeneity.
Because 0.05 < p, the hypothesis can not be rejected, and the results dis-
played in Table 7 column (1) constitute robust evidence in support of our
theory.
Having tested most of the implications of our model, we move to perform the
last test. This is presented in the following section.
4.2.5 Do quality and variety complement each other?
In this section we test the existence of complementarities between quality and
variety innovations. Recall that in our model, this complementarity emerges
as a result of the increasing complexity to innovate, which makes both types
of innovations to grow together.
To explore empirically this issue, we ﬁrst look to the data and we ana-
lyze the correlation between the growth rate of quality and variety at sec-
toral level. We ﬁnd that this correlation is positive, equal to 0.343, and
statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, which provides preliminary evidence sup-
porting our theory. Next, we test indirectly the model, by exploring the
existence of complementarities between quality and variety at ﬁrm level. To
do so, we employ the approach proposed and implemented by Cassiman and
Veugelers[16], which consists in testing Milgrom and Robert’s[38] deﬁnition
of complementarity between two activities. According to the authors, two
23activities complement themselves if adding one activity while the other is
already performed has a higher incremental eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s performance
than adding the activities in isolation. If this complementarity is observed,
then we can infer that both types of innovations must grow together.
To perform the test, we regress a measure of innovation performance,
the percentage of sales attributable to R&D expenditures, on exclusive com-
binations of the innovation activity, which is assumed to be of two types:
quality- and variety-innovations. By restricting the performance measure to
innovation returns only, rather than overall ﬁrm’s performance, we address
the problem of having to control for other sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity, which
may inﬂuence the overall ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The resulting estimation equation is
as follows:
πjt = γ00 + γ11IQjtIVjt + γ10IQjt(1 − IVjt) + γ01IVjt(1 − IQjt)+ (25)
γt + γzZjt + jt,
where IQjt and IVjt are dichotomous variables that take value 1 if ﬁrm j
in period t is a quality and variety innovator, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Zjt is a vector of control variables that includes the exporter condition, the
logarithm of workers, and the R&D intensity of the ﬁrm. Parameters γ00
and γt capture ﬁxed- and time-eﬀects, respectively. Table 9 presents the
estimation results.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Given the results of Table 9, we test the null hypothesis of no complemen-
tarities, γ11 − γ10 = γ01 − γ00, against the alternative that performing both
activities jointly has a larger incremental eﬀect on ﬁrms’ performance than
conducting them separately, γ11 − γ10 > γ01 − γ00. We obtain a p-value
of 0.0347, which means that we reject the null hypothesis, and we provide
evidence in support of our theory.
245 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of product market competition and intellec-
tual property rights protection in biasing the technological change toward
specialization or diversiﬁcation. The paper is suggestive of the role the gov-
ernment might play in order to foster economic progress: while the degree
of product market competition and IPRs have been treated as exogenous in
the analysis, they can be aﬀected by government policies. If sectoral concen-
tration and specialization are positively linked to development, policies that
strengthen the degree of IPRs and/or that internalize the social returns of
innovating vertically, can help to promote economic growth. If instead, diver-
siﬁcation is positively related to development, policies that restrict the degree
of product market competition, such as price ceilings, can foster economic
progress.
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296 Appendix I
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To proof Lemma 1, we follow Sergerstrom[46]. Let G(., t) denote the cumula-
tive distribution of absolute quality qit at time-t. Pick any q > 0 that was the
leading-edge quality at some time t0 ≥ 0, and deﬁne Φ(t) ≡ G(Q,t). Then
Φ(t0) = 1 since no variety can have a quality larger than the leading-edge at
time t0, which by construction is Q.
Then, notice that in the steady state, the following condition must hold,
Φ·(t) + φv
tΦ(t) = 0 holds for all t ≥ t0. To understand this diﬀerential
equation, note that since horizontal innovations represent random draws from
the distribution of quality, they do not change the distribution of quality, and
thus they can be ignored when characterizing the time path of Φ. Next note
that after time t0, the rate at which vertical innovations cause the mass of
varieties behind Q to fall is the overall ﬂow of vertical innovations occurring in
varieties currently behind q. There are Φ(t) of such varieties and the Poisson
arrival rate of vertical innovations in each of these varieties is φv
t. Taking
into account the initial value condition Φ(t0) = 1, the unique solution to the




φsds for all t ≥ t0.
The expression for the growth rate (gQ = φv
t) also represents another
diﬀerential equation, which given the initial condition Qt0 = Q, has a unique
solution Qt = Qe
R t
t0
φsds. Now, deﬁne a ≡
Q
Qt. Then, using the solutions to






Qt for all Q ≥ Q0, which can be alternatively expressed as P(ait ≤
a) = F(a) ≡ a for all a ≥
Q0
Qt. As t converges to +∞,
Q0
Qt converges to zero.
Thus, the distribution of relative quality converges monotonically over time
to the invariant distribution F(.).
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